HF: "Jerry Was a Man" (1947)
See this morning's post for the intro to this week's Heinlein Friday, or the previous posts in the series, linked at the end of this post.
"Jerry Was a Man"
"Jerry Was a Man" was copyrighted in 1947, according to the Wikipedia stub entry on the story. The somewhat longer stub about Assignment In Eternity, the collection in which it appeared in 1953, notes that three of the four stories in the book "contain speculation on what makes one a human" but that only "two of those depict potential for evolution into a superior form of human" - a subject which is decidedly not the topic of JWaM.
The Wiki stub on the story accurately sketches the most basic plot summary, but in noting that the early work had features that would echo in later stories bizarrely draws a parallel to The Moon Is a Harsh Mistress rather than to a number of more apposite stories. Let's deal with those first.
JWaM: Foreshadowing of later RAH works
As the stub says, the shyster (thus called; it's his job description, and on his card) who is recommended (or located) by Mrs. van Vogel's regular attorney, is "splendidly drawn." By this, I assume was meant that he is colorful, irascible, competent, and unethical in the conventional sense. In these features, he exactly mirrors his counterpart in Citizen of the Galaxy, described at some length in the prior Heinlein Friday post, Lawyers Beyond Stereotypes. The shyster, "The Real McCoy," care of the "notorious Three Planets Club," is not a stereotype - but he may be an archetype. That is, he is an "idealized model of a person, object, or concept from which similar instances are derived, copied, patterned, or emulated." McCoy is, in a sense, The Shyster.
As an aside, van Vogel's main attorney, Sidney Weinberg, is an interesting character himself. He is a respectable fellow; he is not a shyster, which as I said is apparently a distinct profession (or branch of the legal profession), with its own recognized specialties and rules. He "retains a staff shyster," I assume in order to best carry out the work he does on behalf of his client, but thinks it best not to reveal to her that he does so. When she needs one, however, he locates a "special shyster" who is willing to do the necessary, for an exorbitant fee. His interior dialogue on this subject is revealing, and implies a legal profession divided by type of work, just as the work appears to reflect the (pre-Federal Rules, i.e. pre-1938) traditional division between law and equity ("We are met today in the mellow light of equity, rather than in the cold and narrow confines of the law." Assignment in Eternity, Baen 1991, p.270). (Legal discussion follows...)
[the rest of this post technically was posted on Saturday; let's call it a delayed Heinlein Friday, ignore the back-dating, and leave it at that.]
More Foreshadowing and Echoes of Heinlein's Other Work
I'll briefly note three frequent features of Heinlein's work, and then move on to the meat of the post.
As in Citizen of the Galaxy and The Man Who Sold the Moon (wikipedia), a proxy battle is itself a proxy for a battle of wills, a central conflict in the story. In this case however, as in I Will Fear No Evil (see HF: Lawyers for discussion of proxy fights in RAH's books, and links for IWFNE), it is not a proxy fight over control over a company which decides the outcome, but rather a court case to settle rights and obligations under law.
Geriatrics, like genetic engineering, are far advanced in the story. The protagonist's regular lawyer is "respectable," as I noted above; he is also 125 years old and more, see pp.259-260. Compare Methuselah's Children, and all the other Lazarus Long stories, including Time Enough for Live, and To Sail Beyond the Sunset.
As in so many other stories, there is a depiction of an intelligent, affectionate pet - in this case, Napoleon the miniature elephant. Compare all the pets mentioned in HF: Aliens.
Like many other Heinlein plots, there's a court scene. See, well, HF: Courts. Heinlein puts an alien on the stand, a Martian who is expert at genetic modification and engineering. The Martian, no particular fan of humanity, moves the action forward by providing the relevant law - which in a real court case would usually be briefed by the parties, rather than dramatically revealed by a testifying witness. One exception might be when a witness is testifying as an expert, and his or her understanding of the relevant law, as applicable to the facts, is relevant to his or her testimony. In this case, however, although the Martian is an expert, his main function is to embarass his employer, which is the opposing party.
The Martian, like the more-than-human aliens in Have Spacesuit - Will Travel (see HF: Aliens, and the bit about the Moderator), indicates disdain for the backward humans. (See p.273, "The court discussed the idea of contempt briefly.") In the process, he draws an equivalence between Jerry, a genetically modified chimpanzee, and the apelike humans.
The Moral of the Story
Why'd Heinlein bother writing this story? What was his point?
He was exploring a very particular what-if, involving some of the deepest philosophical questions Science Fiction can wrestle with. What does it mean to be human? What counts? Where does personhood begin, and where must being a chattel [ed: apparently it's not "chattle" - who knew?] therefore end? Heinlein answers the question, in part, with Art. He also suggests that the ability and inclination to cheat (see p.264) is part and parcel of being human. But his true answer, I think, is Emotion - the ability to experience, and communicate, the sort of feeling which humans interpret as unique to them. Whether this perception is accurate is beyond the scope of this post.... But I suspect that if we could prove that dolphins don't just hurt, but can sorrow, or that chimpanzees don't merely mourn, but can yearn, then we would have to consider altering laws governing (certain) animals.
I note that even in the story, the above-mentioned respectable lawyer cites to a landmark court case, see p.260, which provides supposedly apposite precedent. Its binding effect, of course, requires that a modified chimpanzee be equivalent to an expensive cat: a possession or chattel which cannot be wantonly destroyed if there is still value in the animal, as to some human. If a chimp is like a man, not like a cat, then the rule is distinguishable, and Jerry can at least have the right to be not destroyed - not because he is valuable (he is valued by Mrs. van Vogel, but cannot work because of his failed eyesight - I guess they didn't have Lasik(tm) in this future....) but because he has certain minimal rights.
As his trial attorney argues (note that Jerry no-last-name brought the case "in his own name," italics in original, p.268) that he would be entitled to certain perquisites of "humanity," as the Martian is, p.274-75. "Not for him to vote, nor to hold property, nor to be relieved of special police regulations appropriate to his group" - although how precisely one can have a "human" born and living in a country without having all the usual rights pertaining to personhood and citizenship I'm not sure - it could be legal, but it smells to me.
In fact, the entire sheaf of themes of personhood, "counting" as a man, and race in Jerry bother me a little. At one point, the (unsympathetic)
manager comments that "One Nisei farmer working three neo-chimpanzees can grow as many vegetables as a dozen old-style farm hands." P.254. There are too many things in that one sentence for me to unpack. What is Blakesly referring to? Should we picture Hispanic migrant farm workers? Jim Crow-era blacks? Slaves? No matter what the case, the racial luggage or should I say "freight" - of the statement, in the mouth of a minor villain, continues to puzzle me.
Heinlein's resolution is (spoiler)
If you believe that an animal does not merely feel, but that you understand and feel their feelings as a result, it is nearly impossible not to want to treat them as rough equals - even if animals have always been capable of substantially more than human chauvinists prefer to remember.
Despite the impressive and intricate abilities of animals, I have taken on some of Heinlein's extreme skepticism of the claim that humans are not in some important sense unique. Not, I think, because of his religious beliefs (as in divinity), but because of his unshakeable belief that there is something special about what humans do, in terms of thinking, creating, and feeling. If this belief proves false, then the mantle of humanity (and the protections that go with it) will in my view have to be enlarged.
"Jerry Was a Man"
"Jerry Was a Man" was copyrighted in 1947, according to the Wikipedia stub entry on the story. The somewhat longer stub about Assignment In Eternity, the collection in which it appeared in 1953, notes that three of the four stories in the book "contain speculation on what makes one a human" but that only "two of those depict potential for evolution into a superior form of human" - a subject which is decidedly not the topic of JWaM.
The Wiki stub on the story accurately sketches the most basic plot summary, but in noting that the early work had features that would echo in later stories bizarrely draws a parallel to The Moon Is a Harsh Mistress rather than to a number of more apposite stories. Let's deal with those first.
JWaM: Foreshadowing of later RAH works
As the stub says, the shyster (thus called; it's his job description, and on his card) who is recommended (or located) by Mrs. van Vogel's regular attorney, is "splendidly drawn." By this, I assume was meant that he is colorful, irascible, competent, and unethical in the conventional sense. In these features, he exactly mirrors his counterpart in Citizen of the Galaxy, described at some length in the prior Heinlein Friday post, Lawyers Beyond Stereotypes. The shyster, "The Real McCoy," care of the "notorious Three Planets Club," is not a stereotype - but he may be an archetype. That is, he is an "idealized model of a person, object, or concept from which similar instances are derived, copied, patterned, or emulated." McCoy is, in a sense, The Shyster.
As an aside, van Vogel's main attorney, Sidney Weinberg, is an interesting character himself. He is a respectable fellow; he is not a shyster, which as I said is apparently a distinct profession (or branch of the legal profession), with its own recognized specialties and rules. He "retains a staff shyster," I assume in order to best carry out the work he does on behalf of his client, but thinks it best not to reveal to her that he does so. When she needs one, however, he locates a "special shyster" who is willing to do the necessary, for an exorbitant fee. His interior dialogue on this subject is revealing, and implies a legal profession divided by type of work, just as the work appears to reflect the (pre-Federal Rules, i.e. pre-1938) traditional division between law and equity ("We are met today in the mellow light of equity, rather than in the cold and narrow confines of the law." Assignment in Eternity, Baen 1991, p.270). (Legal discussion follows...)
(show)
[the rest of this post technically was posted on Saturday; let's call it a delayed Heinlein Friday, ignore the back-dating, and leave it at that.]
More Foreshadowing and Echoes of Heinlein's Other Work
I'll briefly note three frequent features of Heinlein's work, and then move on to the meat of the post.
As in Citizen of the Galaxy and The Man Who Sold the Moon (wikipedia), a proxy battle is itself a proxy for a battle of wills, a central conflict in the story. In this case however, as in I Will Fear No Evil (see HF: Lawyers for discussion of proxy fights in RAH's books, and links for IWFNE), it is not a proxy fight over control over a company which decides the outcome, but rather a court case to settle rights and obligations under law.
Geriatrics, like genetic engineering, are far advanced in the story. The protagonist's regular lawyer is "respectable," as I noted above; he is also 125 years old and more, see pp.259-260. Compare Methuselah's Children, and all the other Lazarus Long stories, including Time Enough for Live, and To Sail Beyond the Sunset.
As in so many other stories, there is a depiction of an intelligent, affectionate pet - in this case, Napoleon the miniature elephant. Compare all the pets mentioned in HF: Aliens.
Like many other Heinlein plots, there's a court scene. See, well, HF: Courts. Heinlein puts an alien on the stand, a Martian who is expert at genetic modification and engineering. The Martian, no particular fan of humanity, moves the action forward by providing the relevant law - which in a real court case would usually be briefed by the parties, rather than dramatically revealed by a testifying witness. One exception might be when a witness is testifying as an expert, and his or her understanding of the relevant law, as applicable to the facts, is relevant to his or her testimony. In this case, however, although the Martian is an expert, his main function is to embarass his employer, which is the opposing party.
The Martian, like the more-than-human aliens in Have Spacesuit - Will Travel (see HF: Aliens, and the bit about the Moderator), indicates disdain for the backward humans. (See p.273, "The court discussed the idea of contempt briefly.") In the process, he draws an equivalence between Jerry, a genetically modified chimpanzee, and the apelike humans.
The Moral of the Story
Why'd Heinlein bother writing this story? What was his point?
He was exploring a very particular what-if, involving some of the deepest philosophical questions Science Fiction can wrestle with. What does it mean to be human? What counts? Where does personhood begin, and where must being a chattel [ed: apparently it's not "chattle" - who knew?] therefore end? Heinlein answers the question, in part, with Art. He also suggests that the ability and inclination to cheat (see p.264) is part and parcel of being human. But his true answer, I think, is Emotion - the ability to experience, and communicate, the sort of feeling which humans interpret as unique to them. Whether this perception is accurate is beyond the scope of this post.... But I suspect that if we could prove that dolphins don't just hurt, but can sorrow, or that chimpanzees don't merely mourn, but can yearn, then we would have to consider altering laws governing (certain) animals.
I note that even in the story, the above-mentioned respectable lawyer cites to a landmark court case, see p.260, which provides supposedly apposite precedent. Its binding effect, of course, requires that a modified chimpanzee be equivalent to an expensive cat: a possession or chattel which cannot be wantonly destroyed if there is still value in the animal, as to some human. If a chimp is like a man, not like a cat, then the rule is distinguishable, and Jerry can at least have the right to be not destroyed - not because he is valuable (he is valued by Mrs. van Vogel, but cannot work because of his failed eyesight - I guess they didn't have Lasik(tm) in this future....) but because he has certain minimal rights.
As his trial attorney argues (note that Jerry no-last-name brought the case "in his own name," italics in original, p.268) that he would be entitled to certain perquisites of "humanity," as the Martian is, p.274-75. "Not for him to vote, nor to hold property, nor to be relieved of special police regulations appropriate to his group" - although how precisely one can have a "human" born and living in a country without having all the usual rights pertaining to personhood and citizenship I'm not sure - it could be legal, but it smells to me.
In fact, the entire sheaf of themes of personhood, "counting" as a man, and race in Jerry bother me a little. At one point, the (unsympathetic)
manager comments that "One Nisei farmer working three neo-chimpanzees can grow as many vegetables as a dozen old-style farm hands." P.254. There are too many things in that one sentence for me to unpack. What is Blakesly referring to? Should we picture Hispanic migrant farm workers? Jim Crow-era blacks? Slaves? No matter what the case, the racial luggage or should I say "freight" - of the statement, in the mouth of a minor villain, continues to puzzle me.
Heinlein's resolution is (spoiler)
(show)
If you believe that an animal does not merely feel, but that you understand and feel their feelings as a result, it is nearly impossible not to want to treat them as rough equals - even if animals have always been capable of substantially more than human chauvinists prefer to remember.
Despite the impressive and intricate abilities of animals, I have taken on some of Heinlein's extreme skepticism of the claim that humans are not in some important sense unique. Not, I think, because of his religious beliefs (as in divinity), but because of his unshakeable belief that there is something special about what humans do, in terms of thinking, creating, and feeling. If this belief proves false, then the mantle of humanity (and the protections that go with it) will in my view have to be enlarged.
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Posted by Eh Nonymous on
Saturday July 8, 2006 at 12:17am
Belongs in an anthology.
ed. - You're too kind! As for anthologos (or re-publishing), if anyone is interested in re-using the post, please let me know, by comment or e-mail.
*Not all comments welcome. Flippant, facetious, fierce, or fatuous, fine. Fraudulent, felonious, fabricated, facially insufficient, and farkin' futile, fuggeddaboutit.